> For the complete documentation index, see [llms.txt](https://faction-os.gitbook.io/faction-os-docs/llms.txt). Markdown versions of documentation pages are available by appending `.md` to page URLs; this page is available as [Markdown](https://faction-os.gitbook.io/faction-os-docs/.spec_system/archive/sessions/phase19-session14-channels-and-scope/security-compliance.md). # Security & Compliance Report **Session ID**: `phase19-session14-channels-and-scope` **Package**: null **Reviewed**: 2026-06-27 **Result**: PASS ## Scope **Files reviewed** (session deliverables only): * `packages/protocol/src/taskQueue.ts` - channel-originated task queue source vocabulary. * `packages/protocol/src/guardedActions.ts` - guarded channel proposal vocabulary. * `packages/protocol/src/orchestrationCommandCenter.ts` - channel command, replay, scope, safe-label, and blocked raw-field contracts. * `packages/protocol/tests/orchestrationCommandCenter.test.ts` - protocol channel/scope tests. * `packages/protocol/tests/guardedActions.test.ts` - guarded-action vocabulary regression coverage. * `apps/server/src/lib/channelCommandValidation.ts` - inbound channel and webhook validation. * `apps/server/src/lib/commandCenterValidation.ts` - command-center scope query validation. * `apps/server/src/lib/guardedActionValidation.ts` - guarded channel proposal validation. * `apps/server/src/lib/unsupportedRoutes.ts` - unsupported route classification updates. * `apps/server/src/managers/channelCommandManager.ts` - manager-owned intake, replay guard, and proposal-first conversion. * `apps/server/src/managers/executorRegistry.ts` - proposal-only channel executor capability mapping. * `apps/server/src/managers/orchestrationCommandCenter.ts` - stored channel commands and scope filtering. * `apps/server/src/routes/channelCommands.ts` - channel health, pairing, listing, and webhook intake routes. * `apps/server/src/server.ts` - channel route manager and router wiring. * `apps/server/tests/channelCommandManager.test.ts` - manager replay and conversion tests. * `apps/server/tests/channelCommandRoutes.test.ts` - route validation, auth, replay, and no-raw-echo tests. * `apps/server/tests/commandCenterRoutes.test.ts` - command-center route regression tests. * `apps/server/tests/unsupportedRoutes.test.ts` - unsupported route regression tests. * `apps/adapters/src/shared/channelCommandSource.ts` - adapter channel source attribution helper. * `apps/adapters/tests/channelCommandSource.test.ts` - adapter source redaction tests. * `apps/web/src/components/orchestration/ScopeFilterBar.tsx` - scope filter controls. * `apps/web/src/components/orchestration/ChannelCommandPanel.tsx` - channel command panel. * `apps/web/src/components/orchestration/CommandCenterPanes.tsx` - channel panel mounting. * `apps/web/src/components/orchestration/OrchestrationShell.tsx` - scoped refresh and health loading. * `apps/web/src/components/orchestration/OrchestrationTabs.tsx` - channel health prop wiring. * `apps/web/src/lib/orchestrationApi.ts` - channel clients, scoped query serialization, and error mapping. * `apps/web/src/lib/commandCenterUi.ts` - channel/scope UI view helpers and redaction. * `apps/web/src/store/useGameStore.ts` - scope filter state and channel event normalization. * `apps/web/tests/orchestrationApi.test.ts` - channel/scoped API tests. * `apps/web/tests/commandCenterStore.test.ts` - store normalization and filter tests. * `apps/web/tests/commandCenterUi.test.ts` - UI helper redaction tests. * `apps/web/tests/ChannelCommandPanel.test.tsx` - channel panel component tests. * `apps/web/tests/OrchestrationPanel.test.tsx` - shell integration tests. * `docs/api/README_api.md` - channel/webhook API documentation. * `apps/server/README_server.md` - server channel boundary documentation. * `apps/web/README_web.md` - web channel/scope boundary documentation. * `apps/adapters/README_adapters.md` - adapter attribution helper documentation. **Review method**: Static analysis of session deliverables, targeted grep checks, dependency-manifest inspection, focused tests, and full workspace validation. **Review evidence**: * Command/check: `rg -n "(api[_-]?key|secret|token|authorization|cookie|password)\s*[:=]\s*['\"][^'\"]+" ...session production source/docs... || true` * Result: PASS - no hardcoded production secrets, credentials, tokens, passwords, authorization values, or cookies were reported in session production source/docs. * Evidence: command produced no output. * Command/check: `rg -n "rejectCommandCenterBlockedPayloadFields|normalizeCommandCenterSafeLabel|normalizeCommandCenterRelativePath|parseCommandCenterScopeLabel|rawPayload|rawHeaders|webhookSecret|authorization|cookie|signature" ...session trust-boundary files...` * Result: PASS - protocol and server validation reject blocked raw fields and normalize safe labels/relative paths; web helpers redact bearer tokens and secret-like key/value pairs. * Evidence: matches include `rejectCommandCenterBlockedPayloadFields` in protocol parsers, `parseGenericWebhookCommandBody` and `parseGitHubWebhookCommandBody` calling blocked-field rejection, and web redaction helpers. * Command/check: `rg -n "replayKey|inFlightReplayKeys|idempotency|duplicate|duplicate_trigger|replay" apps/server/src/managers/channelCommandManager.ts apps/server/src/routes/channelCommands.ts apps/server/src/lib/channelCommandValidation.ts apps/web/src/lib/orchestrationApi.ts apps/web/src/store/useGameStore.ts apps/web/src/lib/commandCenterUi.ts` * Result: PASS - replay and duplicate-trigger protections exist at route, manager, conversion, and UI error-mapping boundaries. * Evidence: manager uses `inFlightReplayKeys`, replay map, and conversion idempotency keys; route uses an in-flight mutation lock; web maps replay-key duplicate conflicts to `duplicate_trigger`. * Command/check: `rg -n "(child_process|exec\(|spawn\(|eval\(|new Function|dangerouslySetInnerHTML|innerHTML|document\.write|console\.)" ...session runtime files... || true` * Result: PASS - no unsafe shell/eval/HTML sinks or console diagnostics were found in the session runtime files. * Evidence: command produced no session-specific unsafe sink findings. * Command/check: `git diff --name-only HEAD -- package.json package-lock.json apps/*/package.json packages/*/package.json public-website/package.json public-demo/package.json` and matching untracked manifest check * Result: N/A - no dependency manifest changes in this session. * Evidence: both commands produced no output. * Command/check: `npx -p node@26.2.0 -c 'npm test -- packages/protocol/tests/orchestrationCommandCenter.test.ts apps/adapters/tests/channelCommandSource.test.ts apps/server/tests/channelCommandManager.test.ts apps/server/tests/channelCommandRoutes.test.ts apps/server/tests/commandCenterRoutes.test.ts apps/server/tests/unsupportedRoutes.test.ts apps/web/tests/orchestrationApi.test.ts apps/web/tests/commandCenterStore.test.ts apps/web/tests/commandCenterUi.test.ts apps/web/tests/ChannelCommandPanel.test.tsx apps/web/tests/OrchestrationPanel.test.tsx'` * Result: PASS - focused channel/scope security-relevant suites passed. * Evidence: 11 test files passed and 127 tests passed. * Command/check: `npx -p node@26.2.0 -c 'npm test'` * Result: PASS - full workspace test suite passed. * Evidence: 253 test files passed, 1 skipped; 2921 tests passed, 1 skipped. ## Security Assessment ### Overall: PASS | Category | Status | Severity | Details | | ----------------------------- | ------ | -------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | Injection (SQLi, CMDi, LDAPi) | PASS | -- | No database or shell execution sinks were introduced; targeted sink grep found no session-specific unsafe execution or raw HTML sinks. | | Hardcoded Secrets | PASS | -- | Production source/docs grep found no hardcoded secret assignments; tests use fake secret fixtures to assert redaction. | | Sensitive Data Exposure | PASS | -- | Protocol/server reject blocked raw fields; web/API/UI helpers redact secret-like text; route tests cover no raw echo. | | Insecure Dependencies | PASS | -- | No package manifests or lockfiles changed, so no new dependency risk was introduced. | | Security Misconfiguration | PASS | -- | `apps/server/src/server.ts` mounts rate limiting and local auth before the new channel router; channel execution remains review/proposal-first. | | Database Security | N/A | -- | Session introduced no database layer, SQL, migrations, ORM schema, connection strings, or persisted DB artifacts. | ### Security Findings No security findings. ## GDPR Compliance Assessment ### Overall: PASS **Categories reviewed**: Data Collection & Purpose, Consent Mechanism, Data Minimization, Right to Erasure, PII in Logs, Third-Party Data Transfers. ### Personal Data Inventory | Data Element | Source | Storage | Purpose | Retention | Deletion Path | | ------------------------ | ---------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------ | -------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------- | | Channel source label | Local inbound webhook/channel request | In-memory local command-center state | Operator attribution for proposal-first channel commands | Local process/runtime state | Existing local state reset/erasure flows; no hosted storage added | | Delivery id / replay key | Local inbound webhook/channel request or GitHub delivery header | In-memory local replay map and command record metadata | Duplicate-trigger prevention and audit metadata | Local process/runtime state | Existing local state reset/erasure flows; no hosted storage added | | Bounded command summary | Local inbound webhook/channel request or derived GitHub event metadata | Local command-center records and browser state | Product-facing review of inbound command proposals | Local process/runtime state/browser state | Existing local state reset/erasure flows; no hosted storage added | ### GDPR Findings No GDPR findings. ## Recommendations None -- session is compliant. Future trusted automatic execution, hosted channel identity, public replay, push delivery, or production-hosted intake must perform a new security/GDPR review before making those claims. ## Sign-Off * **Result**: PASS * **Reviewed by**: AI validation (validate) * **Date**: 2026-06-27 --- # Agent Instructions This documentation is published with GitBook. GitBook is the documentation platform designed so that both humans and AI agents can read, navigate, and reason over technical content effectively. Learn more at gitbook.com. ## Querying This Documentation If you need additional information that is not directly available in this page, you can query the documentation dynamically by asking a question. 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